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LIE-DETECTOR TESTS AND "FREEDOM OF THE WILL" IN GERMANY*
An accountant employed by a finance com-
pany in Germany was accused by his employer
of having embezzled 5760 Deutsche Mark (about
$1500) and of faking a burglary in an attempt
to conceal the theft. The accused denied the
accusations, and to prove his innocence he
offered to take a lie-detector test if one could be
arranged. A test was given by the American
military at the request of the local public prose-
cutor, and the results apparently indicated that
the accused was guilty of the offenses. Princi-
pally on the basis of those results, the employee
was convicted of embezzlement and the "simu-
lation of a criminal offense." Upon appeal, the
conviction was reversed by the Bundesgericht-
shof, the highest court of West Germany.'
According to the Supreme Court, basic prin-
ciples of German criminal law prohibit the use of
lie-detector tests because they encroach upon
the freedom of the defendant to form a decision
and to act according to his own will.
The Supreme Court, although admitting that
the first duty of a court in a criminal proceeding
is to determine the truth, held that the search
for the truth must be conducted in accordance
* The article also appears in volume 51 of the
Northwestern University Law Review at page 446.
That article contains additional discussion of the
historical and philosophical aspects of the German
attitude towards the use of lie-detector tests.
I West German Supreme Court, February 16,
1954, 5 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Strafsachen (hereinafter B.G.H. St.) 533.
with established legal principles.2 The accused
is a party to, rather than the object of, a crimi-
nal proceeding, and he cannot be subjected to
any searches or other limitations which are not
provided for by law.3 Moreover, law enforce-
ment agencies have no greater liberty than the
courts in examining an accused because he has
an inviolable right at every stage of the pro-
ceedings to make his own decision with respect
to his answer to the criminal charge. 4 The ac-
cused cannot be forced to cooperate with offi-
cials in their search for the truth.5 This freedom
of an accused is based upon principles of con-
stitutional law and criminal procedure, as well
as upon the concept- that an individual is a
self-accountable moral personality. Infringe-
ments upon this freedom of the will are pro-
hibited regardless of the accused's consent to the
violation. It was this right of the accused to
decide whether and how to answer every
question that the Supreme Court held to be
irreconcilable with the application of a lie-
detector test.
2 Contra, SALER. Grenzen des richterlichen Be-
weses, JURisTIscHE RuNDscnAu, 3: 500-501,
Germany, 1949.
3 RADBRUCH. Grenzen der Kriminalpolizei, Fest-
schriftfuer Wilhelm Sauer, 1949.
4 
VUERTENBERGER. Ist die Anwendung des
Luegendetektors im deutschen Strafverfahren zu-
laessig?, JURISTEN ZEITUnG, 6: 772-773, Germany,
1951.
5 1 B.G.H. St. 342.
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The reasoning behind the decision is this:
During a lie-detector test, the accused may
voluntarily give answers to the questions pre-
sented; however, at the same time, his "true"
answers-and thus the fact of his "guilt"-are
actually obtained against his will. Such insight
into the soul of the accused violates his freedom
of decision and action. It must be prohibited
in criminal proceedings because each individual
has the right to retain an important and unre-
nounceable psychic sphere which is necessary
for the maintenance and development of his
personality.
TiH BASIc CONCEPT
"Freedom of the will" is an important con-
cept in German criminal law and procedure. It
signifies the notion of human dignity and
respect for human rights. The basic explanation
of the individual's relation to society is that
human rights are not regarded as a privilege
granted by society; rather, the individual is an
integral part of a social order which is subservi-
ent to, and not the regulator of, the individual's
rights, his position and his purpose in that
society. German lawyers believe that an inti-
mate understanding of the concepts of freedom
of the will, freedom of the personality and the
physical freedom of the individual is a pre-
requisite to understanding the German judicial
system itself. Although the law is regarded as
an ever-growing body which changes to reflect
the intellectual progress or stagnation of a
particular generation, the concept of a free will
is recognized as a permanent and basic principle
of the criminal law.6
Apart from the historical, philosophical and
dogmatical aspects of the concept of freedom
of the will, the primary sources of the protection
afforded the human personality are the Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the present Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Constitution guarantees the dignity of
the individual, thc right to free development
of his personality and the physical safety of
his person, and these rights can be limited only
6 MEZGER, STRAFRECUT 85, 1949.
as provided by law.7 The broad constitutional
safeguards reaffirm principles which governed
the German legal system prior to 1933, but
which were completely disregarded by the Nazi
regime.$
A more specific provision concerning the
examination of an accused is set forth in Section
136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which,
literally translated, provides:
1. At the beginning of the examination the ac-
cused must be informed as to the nature of the
punishable act of which he is accused. The ac-
cused must be asked whether he wants to answer
anything with respect to the accusations.
As interpreted by the courts and most author-
ities on criminal procedure, this provision of the
Code adequately expresses the broad scope of
the protection which is to be given to the free-
dom of the will and personality of the accused.
However, this once terror stricken nation pre-
ferred to leave no possible doubt with respect
to limitations in examining detained persons;
therefore, the legislature enacted Section 136a
of the Code to prohibit specifically methods of
interrogation which, under more general pro-
visions of the Constitution and Code, were
considered unlawful. Section 136a of the Code,
literally translated, provides:
The relevant articles of the German Constitu-
tion, literally translated, are:
Article 1. The dignity of man shall be inviolable.
To respect and to protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority.
Article 2. Everyone shall have the right to free
development of his personality insofar as he does
not infringe rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or the moral code.
Everyone shall have the right to life and physical
inviolability. The freedom of the individual shall be
inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only
in accordance with the law.
Article 104. The freedom of the individual may
be restricted only on the basis of a formal law and
only with due regard for the forms prescribed
therein. Detained persons may not be subjected
either to physical or mental ill-treatment.
8 Whether the guaranty of freedom of the per-
sonality now expressed in the Constitution affords
morc protection than the 80-year-old Code of
19571
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1. The freedom of the accused to form a decision
and the freedom to act according to his own will
shall not be impaired by ill-treatment, fatigue,
bodily invasion, use of drugs, torture, deception, or
hypnosis. Force can be used only to the extent per-
mitted by the law of criminal procedure. The threat
of measures not provided for by the law of criminal
procedure, and the promise of a non-legally pro-
vided advantage are prohibited.
2. Measures which impair the memory and judg-
ment of the accused are not allowed.
3. The prohibitions of paragraph I and paragraph
2 shall be in force without regard to the consent of
the accused. Testimony received by offending
against these prohibitions shall not be utilized
even in the case where the accused consents to
its use.
LIE-DETECTOR TESTS AS INFRINGEMENTS
UPON "F-tE-DOM OF THE WILL"
The broad scope of the laws protecting the
dignity and free will of the individual obviously
raises many doubts as to the legality of the ap-
plication of lie-detector tests. However, the
problem was not discussed by German legal
writers until "truth-serum tests" and lie-
detector techniques were made available to the
regular law enforcement agencies after World
War II.
Both practices were discussed with reference
to the questions of whether and to what extent
the body of the accused could be utilized to
elicit facts within his knowledge and thereby
ascertain the truth and arrive at a just verdict
regarding the case at hand. The conclusions
reached concerning the legality of administer-
ing truth-serum tests were considered to be
equally applicable with respect to the legality of
lie-detector tests.9 Both means of interrogating
an accused, in the opinion of most German
authorities, represented illegal attempts to
circumvent the right of the accused not to
Criminal Procedure presents an interesting problem
more from the point of view of practical usefulness
against the techniques of a police state than as an
abstract exercise in constitutional law.
9 See, e.g., the opinion of the highest state court
in Rheinland-Westphalen, March 23, 1950.
DEUTSCHE RECHTSZEITSCHRIFT, 5: 212, 1950.
express himself with respect to the criminal
charge.1
The advocates of lie-detector testing, on the
other hand, advanced the argument that such
"silent communications" may lawfully be
evaluated as evidence. Their reasoning was that
lie-detector recordings are observations of the
external appearances of the accused which are
noticeable in a more exact form than when the
accused is observed without an instrumental
aid." Section 81a of the Code,"2 which authorizes
an examination of the body of the accused to
establish facts which are relevant to the pro-
ceedings, was cited as the legal basis for lie-
detector tests even when the accused objects to
the test."3 Since the questioning during the test
was thought not to impair the accused's freedom
to act according to his own will, Sections 136
and 136a of the Code were not viewed as pro-
hibitions against lie-detector tests.' 4
The argument that lie-detector test record-
ings are only a new method of observing in-
voluntary external expressions was met with
the argument that the recordings disclose the
otherwise concealed psychic structure of the
accused and that they are an actual attempt to
discover what might be present only in the
unconsciousness of the accused."5 Most authori-
ties adopted this latter view and disapproved of
any method of obtaining expressions which are
not noticeable to the examiner himself. Under
10 See, e.g., KoRMAAs. Zur Anwendung des
Luegendetektors, JURISTISCHE RUNDScHAU, 7: 450,
Germany, 1953.
" LEss. Zur Anwendung experimental-psycho-
logiscier Methoden by Zeugen, DRlrrscaE RiEcHTS-
ZEITScHRiFT, 5: 322, Germany, 1950.
12 Section 81a, literally translated, provides:
An examination of the body of the accused can
be ordered in order to establish facts which are
relevant to the proceeding. Other persons can be
examined without their consent only for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether there exist on their
body positive signs or effects of a criminal act.
3LEss, supra note 11, at 322; ERBs. Unzu-
laessige Vernehmungsmethoden, NEUE JuIRsTiscHE
WOCHENScm=RT, 4: 386, Germany, 1951.
14 SEELIG. LEHRBUCH DER KRIMINOLOGIE, p.
242, 1951. ERBs, supra note 13, at 387.
"W'AVL7ERTENBERGER, Supra note 4, at 772-773.
(Vol. 47
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
this view, the lie-detector disclosure of secret
physiological reactions, followed by the ex-
aminer's evaluation, becomes the equivalent of
an involuntary communication. 6 And obtain-
ing communications regardless of whether the
accused is willing to make them violates his
right to decide whether he wants to answer the
criminal charge. 17 The opponents of lie-detector
testing have several grounds for refuting the
argument that the tests are authorized under
Section 81a of the Code as an "examination of
the body of the accused." Thus, one group
argued that the intent of the legislature in
enacting section 81a was to allow only proof of
the physical condition of the body of the ac-
cused." Another group argued that section 136a
controls to prohibit the use of lie-detector tests
inasmuch as the prohibitions of that section
were meant to be illustrative of unlawful
practices rather than an all inclusive listing.19
A third group opposing the use of lie-detector
tests argued that even if sections 136 and 136a
were not directly controlling, the application of
lie-detector tests would be prohibited by the
fundamental principles of criminal law which
recognize the right of an accused to remain
silent without fear of thereby incurring legal
disadvantages.2'
The prevailing view which considers the use
of lie-detector tests to be unlawful is in har-
mony with Article One of the Federal Constitu-
16 NowAxowsla. Sind Verfahren wir Erzidung
unwillkuerliher Aeusserungen des Beschuldiglten
zutaessig?, JUlusTIsc E BALXArR 71: 4, 7, Austria,
1949.
"7KolmuAAs, supra note 10, at 451; NowA-
Kowsr, supra note 16, at 6; WVUERTENBERGER,
supra note 4, at 773.
I NsE. Narkoanalyse als doppelfunklionelle
Prozesshandlung, ZEiTscH=R~t FUER DIE GEsAurE
STa crAsRwSWISSENseHAlT, 63:199, 224, Germany,
1951; EBERHARD MScHM. Zur Frage der Funarkon-
Versuixhe in der geritllichen Praxis, SUED-DEuTsCHE
JuRisTEN-ZErrtUNG, 4: 450-452, Germany, 1949;
WuERTENoERGER, supra note 4, at 774.
19METz. Zur Frage der Zidaessigkeit der An-
wendung des "Luegendeektors" im Strafverfahren,
NEuE Jl iIsmscaa WocENscHRrFr, 4: 752, Ger-
many, 1951.
20 IVUERTENBERGER, supra note 4, at 773
tion and the statutory provisions which protect
the individual's free will.21 This regard for the
dignity and freedom of decision of the human
being as a moral person does not leave any
room for the use of devices which explore his
inner life."
Furthermore, most authorities agree with the
decision of the Supreme Court that the consti-
tutional prohibition of the use of lie-detector
tests cannot be waived by the accused." The
state has an affirmative duty under Article One
of the Constitution to safeguard the human
dignity and free will. Thus, these rights are of
super-individual concern and must be protected
against infringements by the individual himself
as well as against encroachments by the state
authority. 4 The right of an accused to decide
whether and how to answer a criminal charge
must not be renounceable if the smallest degree
of moral freedom is to be preserved in the
criminal procedure.
Practical considerations, as well as general
principles, support the exclusion of lie-detector
tests regardless of the accused's consent. A
refusal to submit to the test, or even a lack of a
spontaneous offer to take it, may result in an
unfavorable reflection on theaccused.25 Further-
more, an option to take the test would appear
to be a type of indirect coercion which is
expressly prohibited by Section 136a (3) of the
Code. 6
A separate aspect of the problem under con-
sideration concerns the use of lie-detector tests
in the interrogation of witnesses. The authori-
ties who are opposed to the use of lie-detector
tests have little, if any, difficulty in determining
that such examinations are unlawful inasmuch
as the safeguards provided by Section 136a of
the Code have been made applicable to the
"KARL PETERS. Narkoanayse?, JURISTISCHE
RuNDscHAu, 4: 47, Germany, 1950; SCMIT
supra note 18 at 456; SCHOENKE. Grenzen des
Sackerstaendigoibeweises, DEUTSCHE RECHTSZEIT-
scaRiPT, 5: 145, Germany, 1950.
"2 NIESE, supra note 18, at 226.
"See notes 18, 21, supra.
24 NisF, supra note 18, at 226.
2 KOHLHAAS, supra note 10, at 450.
21 METZ, supra note 19, at 752.
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